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Abstract
Different forms of resource allocation—by markets, cooperative games, and
by social choice—are unified by one condition, limited arbitrage, which is de-
fined on the endowments and the preferences of the traders of an Arrow Debreu
economy. Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a com-
petitive equilibrium in economies with or without short sales, and with finitely or
infinitely many markets. The same condition is also necessary and sufficient for
the existence of the core, for resolving Arrow's paradox on choices of large utility
values, and for the existence of social choice rules which are continuous, anony-
mous and respect unanimity, thus providing a unified perspective on standard
procedures for resource allocation. When limited arbitrage does not hold, social
diversity of various degrees is defined by the properties of a topological invariant
of the economy, the cohomology rings CH of a family of cones which are naturally
associated with it. CH has additional information about the resource allocation
properties of subsets of traders in the economy and of the subeconomies which
they span.
Social diversity is central to resource allocation. People trade because they are
different. Gains from trade and the scope for mutually advantageous reallocation
depend naturally on the diversity of the traders' preferences and endowments. The
market owes its existence to the diversity of those who make up the economy.
An excess of diversity could however stretch the ability of economic institutions
to operate efficiently. This is a concern in regions experiencing extensive and rapid
migration, such as Canada, the USA and the ex-USSR. Are there natural limits on
the degree of social diversity with which our institutions can cope? This paper will
argue that there are. I will argue that not only is a certain amount of diversity
essential for the functioning of markets, but, at the other extreme, that too much
diversity of a society's preferences and endowments may hinder its ability to allocate
resources efficiently.
Somewhat unexpectedly, the very same level of diversity which hinders the func-
tioning of markets also hinders the functioning of democracy, and other forms of
resource allocation which are obtained through cooperative games, such as the core.1
The main tenet of this paper is that there is a crucial level of social diversity which
determines whether all these forms of resource allocation will function properly.
Social diversity has been an elusive concept until recently. I give here a precise
definition, and examine its impact on the most frequently used forms of resource
allocation. From this analysis a new unified perspective emerges: a well-defined
connection between resource allocation by markets, games and social choices, which
have been considered distinct until now. I define a limitation on social diversity
which links all these forms of resource allocation. This limitation is a condition on
the endowments and the preferences of the traders of an Arrow Debreu economy. In
its simpler form I call this limited arbitrage2. This concept is related with that of
"'no-arbitrage"3 used in finance, but it is nonetheless different from it. I show that
limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium in
Arrow Debreu economies, and this equivalence extends to economies with or without
short sales4 and with finitely or infinitely many markets,5 Theorems 2 and 5. Limited
arbitrage is also necessary and sufficient for the existence of the core,6 Theorem 7, and
its simplest failure is sufficient for the existence of the supercore, a concept which
is introduced to gauge social cohesion, Theorem 8. In addition, limited arbitrage
is necessary and sufficient for solving Arrow's paradox (Arrow, 1951) on choices of
large utility value, i.e. for the existence of well-defined social choice rules,7 Theorem
9. It is also necessary and sufficient for the existence social choice rules which are
continuous, anonymous and respect unanimity (Chichilnisky 1980,1982), Theorem 13.
The success of all four forms of resource allocation, by financial and real competitive
markets, by cooperative games and by social choice, hinges on precisely the same
limitation on the social diversity of the economy.
Shifting the angle of inquiry slightly sheds a different light on the subject. The re-
sults predict that a society which allocates resources efficiently by markets, collective
choices or cooperative games, must exhibit no more than a certain degree of social
diversity. This is an implicit prediction about the characteristics of those societies
which implement successfully these forms of resource allocation. Increases in social
diversity beyond this threshold may call for forms of resource allocation which are
different from all those which are used today.
The results of this paper are intuitively clear. New forms of resource allocation
appear to be needed in order to organize effectively a diverse society. But the issue is
largely avoided by thinkers and policy makers alike because the institutions required
for this do not yet exist, creating an uncomfortable vacuum. This paper attempts to
formalize the problem within a rigorous framework and so provide a solid basis for
theory and policy.
As defined here social diversitycom.es in many "shades", of which limited arbitrage
is only one. The whole concept of social diversity is subtle and complex. It is
encapsuled in an algebraic object, a family of cohomology rings8 denoted CH, which
are naturally associated with a family of cones defined from the endowments and
preferences of the traders in the economy. Limited arbitrage simply measures whether
the cones intersect or not, while the rings CH measure this and more: CH reveal the
intricate topology of how these cones are situated with respect to each other. The
cohomology rings CH give a topological invariant of the economy, in the sense that
CH is invariant under continuous deformations of the measurement of commodities.
It is also structurally stable, remaining invariant under small errors of measurement.
This concept of diversity is therefore ideal for the social sciences where measurements
are imprecise and difficult to obtain. The properties of CH predict specific properties
of the economy such as which subeconomies have a competitive equilibrium and which
do not, which have a social choice rule and which do not, which have a core, and
which have a supercore, Theorem 8. The latter concept, the supercore, measures the
extent of social cohesion, namely the extent to which a society has reasons to stay
together or break apart. I prove that, somewhat paradoxically, the mildest form of
social diversity predicts whether the supercore exists, even in economies where the
preferences may not be convex.
The results presented here have two distinguishing features. One is that they pro-
vide a minimal condition which ensures that an Arrow Debreu equilibrium,9 the core
and social choice rules exist, namely a condition which is simultaneously necessary
and sufficient for the existence of solutions to each of these three forms of resource
allocation. The second is they extend and unify the Arrow Debreu formulation of
markets to encompass economies with or without short sales10 and with finitely or
infinitely many markets.
While sufficient conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium have been
known for about forty years, starting from the works of Von Neumann, Nash, Arrow
and Debreu, the study of necessary and sufficient for resource allocation introduced
in Chichilnisky (1991, 1992, 1993c, 1994a,b,c, 1995) had been neglected previously.
A necessary and sufficient condition is a useful tool. As an illustration consider the
necessary and sufficient ("first order") conditions for partial equilibrium analysis of
convex problems. These are among the most widely used tools in economics: they
identify and help compute solutions in the theories of the consumer and of the firm,
and in optimal growth theory. Equally useful could be a necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of market clearing allocations. Furthermore, in order to
prove the equivalence between different problems of resource allocation one needs
"tight" characterizations: a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium, the
core and social choice is needed to establish the equivalence of these different forms
of resource allocation.
It seems useful to elaborate on a geometric interpretation of limited arbitrage
because it clarifies its fundamental links with the problem of resource allocation. It
was recently established that the non-empty intersection of the cones which defines
limited arbitrage is equivalent to a topological condition on the spaces of preferences
(Chichilnisky 1980a, 1993c). The topological condition is contractibility, a form of
similarity of preferences11 (Chichilnisky 1980, Heal 1983). Contractibility is necessary
and sufficient for the existence of social choice rules, see Chichilnisky and Heal (1983).
It turns out that the equivalence between non-empty intersection and contractibility
is the link between markets and social choices. The contractibility of the space of
preferences is necessary and sufficient for the existence of social choice rules, while
non-empty intersection (limited arbitrage) is necessary and sufficient for the existence
of a market equilibrium. One main result brings all this together: a family of convex
sets has a non-empty intersection if and only if every subfamily has a contractible
union, see Chichilnisky (1980a,1993).12
Using similar topological results,13 Theorem 6 establishes a link between the num-
ber of traders and the number of commodities: the economy has limited arbitrage
if and only if every subeconomy of iV -I- 1 traders does, where N is the number of
commodities traded in the market.
As already mentioned, I consider economies with or without short sales: net trades
are either bounded below, as in a standard Arrow Debreu economy, or they are not
bounded at all. This is a considerable extension from the Arrow Debreu theory, as
it includes financial markets in which short trades typically occur.14 In addition, the
economy could have finitely or infinitely many markets: the results obtain in either
case15, Theorem 3.
It is somewhat surprising that the same condition of limited arbitrage is necessary
and sufficient for the existence of a market equilibrium with or without short sales
(Theorem 2).16 The non-existence of a competitive equilibrium is seemingly a different
phenomenon in economies with short sales than it is in economies without short sales.
With short sales, the problem of non-existence arises when traders with very different
preferences17 desire to take unboundedly large positions against each other, positions
which cannot be accommodated within a bounded economy. Instead, without short
sales, the problem arises when some traders have zero income. Yet I show that in
both cases the source of the problem is indeed the same: the diversity of the traders
leads to ill-defined demand behavior at the potential market clearing prices, and
prevents the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Limited arbitrage ensures that
none of these problems arises: with or without short sales it bounds the diversity
of traders precisely as needed for a competitive equilibrium to exist. Theorem 3
links the number of markets with the number of traders in a somewhat unexpected
manner.
It is also somewhat surprising that the same condition of limited arbitrage en-
sures the existence of an equilibrium in economies with either finitely or infinitely
many markets. The problem of existence appears to be different in these two cases,
and indeed they are treated quite differently in the literature. A typical problem in
economies with infinitely many markets is that positive orthants have empty interior,
so that the Hahn-Banach theorem cannot be used to find equilibrium prices for effi-
cient allocations.18 A solution to this problem was found in 1980: (Chichilnisky and
Kalman, 1980) extended the Hahn-Banach theorem by introducing a cone condition
and proving that it is necessary and sufficient for supporting convex sets whether or
not they have an interior. Thereafter the cone condition has been used extensively to
prove existence in economies with infinitely many markets and is by now a standard
condition on preferences defined on infinitely many markets, known also under the
name of "propernessr of preferences in subsequent work.19 The fundamental new fact
presented here is that limited arbitrage implies the cone condition on efficient and
affordable allocations, Theorem 3.20 Therefore by itself limited arbitrage provides
a unified treatment of economies with finitely and infinitely many markets, being
necessary and sufficient for the existence of equilibrium and the core in all cases.
In a nutshell: in all cases limited arbitrage bounds gains from trade. Proposition 4,
and is equivalent to the compactness of the set of Pareto efficient utility allocations,
Theorem I.21 Gains from trade and the Pareto frontier are fundamental concepts
involved in most forms of resource allocation: in markets, in games and in social
choice. Limited arbitrage controls them all.
1 Definitions and Examples
An Arrow Debreu market E = {X, fi/^u/i, h = 1,..., H} has H > 2 traders, indexed
h — 1,...,H, N > 2 commodities and consumption or trading space22 X = R+ or
X = RN; in Section 5 X is a Hilbert space of infinite dimension. The vector fi^ £ R+
denotes trader /J'S property rights or initial endowment and Q = (Ylh=i ^h) 1S the
total endowment of the economy; when X = R+, O > > 0.23 Traders may have zero
endowments of some goods. Each trader h has a continuous and convex preference
represented by Uh '. X —> R. This paper treats in a unified way general convex
preferences where the normalized gradients define either an open or a closed map
x —> Du(a;)/1|Z)u(x) || on every indifference surface, so that either (i) all indifference
surfaces contain no half lines or (ii) the normalized gradients to any closed set of
indifferent vectors define a closed set. Some traders may have preferences of one
type, and some of the other. Case (i) includes strictly convex preferences, and case
(ii) linear preferences. All the assumptions and the results in this paper are ordinal;24
therefore without loss of generality one normalizes utilities so that for all /i, Uh(0) = 0
and supfx.xeX\Ufl(x) = oo. Preferences are increasing, i.e. x > y => Uh(x) > Uh(y).
When X = R+ either indifference surfaces of positive utility are contained in the
interior of X, R++, such as Cobb-Douglas utilities, or if an indifference surface of
positive utility intersects a boundary ray, it does so transversally.25
Definition 1 A preference is uniformly non-sat iated when it is represented by a
utility Uh with a bounded rate of increase,26 e.g. for smooth preferences: 3e, K > 0 :
Vx G X, K > || DIM (a;) || > £•
Uniformly non-satiated preferences are rather common: for example, preferences
represented by linear utilities are uniformly non-satiated. The condition is a gener-
alization of a standard Liftschitz condition.
Proposition 1 If a utility function Uh : RN —> R is uniformly non-satiated its indif-
ference surfaces are within uniform distance from each other, i.e. Vr, s £ R, 3Ar(r, s) (E
R such that x G u^l(r) => 3y € ujl1(s) with \\x — y\\ < N(r, s).
Proof. This is immediate from the definition. •




Figure 1. This preference is not uniformly nonsatiated because two indifference
surfaces spread apart forever
Assumption 1. When X = RN, the preferences in the economy E
are uniformly non-satiated.
This includes preferences which are strictly convex or not, preferences whose
indifference surfaces of positive utility intersect the boundary or not, and preferences
whose indifference surfaces contain half lines or not, and are bounded below or not.
Figure 2 illustrates.
Figure 2. This preference is uniformly nonsatiated
The space of feasible allocations is T = {(#i, ...,XH) G XH : Ylh=ixh — ^ } -
The set of supports to individually rational affordable efficient resource
allocations is:
5(E) = {v G RN : if {xl...xH) G T with uh(xh) > uh(Qh)\/h = 1,...//,
(v,Xh - fi/»> = 0, then 1 (^2/1) > Uh(xh) V/i implies (i>, z^ - a:^ } > 0}. (1)
The set of prices orthogonal to the endowments is27
N = {v € #+ - {0} : 3/i with (v, Qh) = 0}. (2)
The utility possibility set of the economy E is the set of feasible and individually
rational utility allocations:
U(E) = {(Vi,..., VH) : V/i, Vh = uh(xh) > uh(Qh) > 0,
for some (xi, ...,XH) € T }.
The Pareto frontier of the economy E is the set of feasible, individually rational
and efficient utility allocations:
P(E) = {V G U(E) :~ 3W G U{E) : W > V} C R%. (3)
A competitive equilibrium of E consists of a price vector p* £ R+ and an allocation
(x\...x*H) G XH such that x*h optimizes u^ over the budget set Bh(p*) = {x G X :
(x,p*) = (nh,p*)} and Ef=i x*h-Qh = 0.
1.1 Global and Market Cones
The global cones defined here are identical to those introduced in Chichilnisky (1995);
the notation is adapted to the context. Two cases, X = RN and X = R+, are
considered separately.
• Consider first X = RN.
Definition 2 For trader h define the global cone of directions along which utility
increases without bound:
Ah{Qh) = {x G X : Vy G X, 3X > 0 : uh(Slh + Xx) > uh(y)}
This cone contains global information on the economy.28 In ordinal terms, the rays
of this cone intersect all indifference surfaces corresponding to bundles preferred by
Uh to Qh. This cone and the part of its boundary along which utility never ceases to
increase define:
Gh(nh) = {x € X :~ 3 Maxx>Quh(nh + Xx)}
This cone is identical to the global cone of Chichilnisky (1995), p. 85, (4);29 the
current definition treats all convex preferences in a unified way. Under Assumption 1
Gh(Qh) has a simple structure: when preferences have half lines in their indifferences
Gh(Q*h) equals ^ ( (7^) ; when indifferences contain no half lines, then Gh(Qh) 1S its
closure, see also Chichilnisky 1995, p. 85.
Definition 3 The market cone of trader h is
Dh(nh) = {z <= X : Vj/ e Gh(Qh), (z, y) > 0} (4)
Dh is the cone of prices assigning strictly positive value to all directions of net
trades leading to eventually increasing utility. This is a convex cone.
The following proposition establishes the structure of the global cones, and is used
in proving the connection between limited arbitrage, equilibrium and the core:
Proposition 2 / / the function u^ : RN —• R is uniformly non-satiated: (i) The
interior of the global cone is
G°h(nh) = A°h(nh)
= {z G Gh(nh) : Umx^ooUh(nh + Xz) = oo} ^ 0.
(ii) The boundary of the cone Gh(ft>h), dGh(&h)i contains (a) those directions along
which utility increases towards a bounded value that is never reached:
Bh(Qh) = {ze dAh(tth) : VA > 0, uh(nh + Xz) ^ lim uh(Qh + Xz) < oo}
A—>oo
and (b) those directions along which the utility eventually achieves a constant value:
Ch(Qh) = {z£ dAh{Qh) :3N:X^>N=> uh(nh 4- A*) = uh(Qh + fiz)},
(Hi) the interior of the global cone, its boundary and its closure and the cones G^ and
Dh are uniform across all vectors in the space, i.e. Vfi, A € X :
Bh(n)UCh(Q) c dGh(Q) = dGh(A) = dGh
Gh(Q) = Gh(A)
and in particular
(iv) For general non-satiated preferences Gh{Q>h) and Dh{£lh) may not be uniform.
Proof. The three sets Ah(£lh), Bh{Qh) and (7^(0^) are disjoint pairwise and
Ah(Qh) U Bh(Qh) U Ch(nh) U Hh(Qh) = RN. (5)
where Hh(Qh) is the complement of Ah(Qh) u Bh(Qh) U C^O/J, i.e. the set of direc-
tions along which the utility achieves a maximum value and decreases thereafter.
The first step is to show that Bh{£lh)UC^(0^) C dGh(Vth). Observe that monotonic-
ity and the condition of uniform non satiation imply that the rate of increase is
uniformly bounded below along the direction defined by the vector (1,. . . . , 1) (or
along any direction defined by a strictly positive vector). This implies that if 2 €
Bh{Qh)UCh(nh)
s » z=> se Ah(Qh)
and
s « z =» s G Hh(Qh)
Therefore the sets ^ ( f ^ U C ^ O ^ ) is in the boundary of the set Ah(fth)- The relation
between Gh(Qh) and Ah(Qh) is now immediate, cf. Chichilnisky (1995) p. 85, (4).
The next step is to show that Ah(£lh) ls identical everywhere. It suffices to
show that if two different half-lines I = {Q^ + Xv}\>o and m = {A^ + Xv}A>O are
parallel translates of each other, and I C Ah(Qh), then m C Ah(Ah),V Ah € m.
This is immediate from Assumption 1, which ensures that the rate of increase of the
function u^ is bounded above: if the values of the function u^ on m were bounded
above, while exceeding every bounded value over the (parallel) line I, then the rate
of increase of the utility would be unbounded above.
By assumption, preferences either have half lines in their indifferences, or they
don't: in either case the sets Bh(ft>h) and Ch(Clh) are uniform. In addition, Ah(flh)
is uniform as well. Therefore to complete the proof it remains only to show that the
cones Gh(^lh) are the same everywhere under Assumption 1.
Observe that for a general convex preference represented by a utility uh the set
Gh(&*h) may vary as the vector Q^ varies, since the set Bh{£lh) itself may vary with
fib,: at some Qh a direction z £ dGh may be in Bh(Qh) and at others Bh(Qh) may
be empty and z G Ch(ft>h) instead. This occurs when along a ray defined by a vector
2 from one endowment the utility levels asymptote to a finite limit but do not reach
their limiting value, while at other endowments, along the same direction 2, they
achieve this limit. This example, and a similar reasoning for ^ ( 0 ^ ) , proves (iv).
However, such cases are excluded here, since under our assumptions on preferences,
for each trader, either all indifference surfaces contain half lines, or none do. This
completes the proof of the proposition. •
Asymptotes
indifference curves Indiffecurves
Figure 3. This preference has a 'fan' of different directions along which the utility
values reach a bounded utility value. Assumption 1 is not satisfied. All the
directions in the fan are in the recession cone but not in the global cone G^ nor in
the cone Ah-
• Consider next the case: X = R+
Definition 4 The market cone of trader h is:
D+(Qh) = Dh(Qh)f]S(E) ifS(E) C N,
= Dh(Qh) otherwise,
where S(E) and N are defined in (1) and (2).30
(6)
There is no analog to Proposition 2 when X = R+; indeed, when X = R+ the
market cones D^(Qh) typically vary with the initial endowments. However, when
fi/i e #++, the interior of R%, then D^(Qh) = Dh (Qh) and therefore D^(Qh) is the
same for all endowments in
Proposition 3 When X = R+ and an indifference surface of u^ corresponding to
a positive consumption bundle x > 0 intersects a boundary ray31 r C dX, then
Proof. Recall that we assumed Uh(0) = 0, and that the preference's indifference
surfaces of positive utility are either (a) contained in the interior of R+, R++, or (b)
they intersect a boundary ray r of R+ and do so transversally. In case (a) the proposi-
tion is satisfied trivially, because no indifference surface of strictly positive value ever
intersects the boundary of R+. In case (b) the proposition follows immediately from
the definition of transversality. Observe that it is possible that supxer(uh(x)) < oo. •
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1.2 The Core and the Supercore
Definition 5 The core of the economy E is the set of allocations which no coalition
can improve upon within its own endowments:
C(E) = {(si xH) e RNxH : Y,(*h ~ Qh) = 0 and^ J C {1 H) :
h
and {yh}heJ s.t. E j G j f c - fy) = 0, Y; £ J, Uj(yj) > UJ(XJ),
and 3j G J : Uj(yj) > UJ(XJ)}.
Definition 6 The supercore of the economy is the set of allocations which no strict
sub coalition can improve using only its own endowments. It is therefore a superset
of the core:
SC(E) = {{(zi,..., xH) <= RNxH : ^ 2(xh - nh) = 0 and - J C {1,..., }] :
J ^ {1,..., H}and {^}he j s.t.Vj G J, Ujfoj) > Wjfe), Eje j f e ~ ^i) = °> a n d
3j € J :uj(yj) > UJ(XJ)}.
By construction, C(E) C SC(E). The motivation for this concept is as follows: if an
allocation is in the supercore, no strict subcoalition of traders can improve upon this
by itself. A non-empty supercore means that no strict subsets of individuals can do
better than what they can do by joining the entire .group. The benefits from joining
the larger group exceed those available to any subgroup. One can say therefore that
an economy with a non-empty supercore has reasons to stay together: There is no
reason for such a society to break apart. If an economy that has stayed together for
some time, it probably has a non-empty supercore.
2 Limited Arbitrage: Definition and Examples
This section provides the definition of limited arbitrage. It gives an intuitive inter-
pretation for limited arbitrage in terms of gains from trade, and contrasts limited
arbitrage with the arbitrage concept used in financial markets. It provides examples
of economies with and without limited arbitrage.
Definition 7 When X = RN, E satisfies limited arbitrage when
H
(LA) (]Dh^(b.






Figure 4. Limited arbitrage is satisfied: feasible allocations lead to bounded utility
increases.
Figure 5. Limited arbitrage is not satisfied: there exist a feasible unbounded
sequence of allocations, (W\, W[), (W2, W2), ••• , along which both traders' utility
never ceases to increase.
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2.1 Interpretation of Limited Arbitrage as Bounded Gains From
Trade when X = RN
Limited arbitrage has a simple interpretation in terms of gains from trade when
X = R1^. Gains from trade are defined by:
H
G(E) = sup{2_](uh(xh) ~ Ufi(Q,h)}, where
h=\
H
- Qh) = 0, and V/i, uh(xh) > uh(Qh) > °-
The Proposition below applies to preferences where the normalized gradients de-
fine a closed map on every indifference surface, i.e. case (ii); the Corollary following
it applies both to case (i) and (ii):
Proposition 4 In case (ii), the economy E satisfies limited arbitrage if and only if
gains from trade are bounded*3 i.e. if and only if
G(E) < oo.
Proof. Assume E has limited arbitrage. If G(E) was not bounded there would exist a
sequence of net trades (z{...zJH)j=ii2... such that (i)Vj, Ylh=i zh = >^ ^ i 3 uh(zD > 05
and (ii) for some h = g, limJ_>oo(u5(054-^)) —> oo. Next I will show that if \\zJh\\ —> oo,
and {^/||^||}j=i,2,... denotes a convergent subsequence, then Zh = lim^ 2^/||2^|| G
Gfr. The proof is by contradiction. By Proposition 2 the cone G^ is uniform so without
loss of generality we may assume that V/i O^ = 0. If Zh € G^,34 then by quasiconcavity
of uh and by Proposition 2, along the ray defined by zh the utility Uh achieves a
maximum level u°, say at Aoz, for some Ao > 0, and it decreases thereafter, i.e. A >
Ao =^> uh(Xz) < u°. Define a function 0 : R+ —• R+ by uh(\zh + O(X)e) = u°, where
e = (1,. . . , 1). I will show that 6 is a convex function so necessarily lim\-+oc6{\) = oo.
By convexity of preferences
u° < uh(a(Xzh + 6(\)e) + (1 - a){X'zh + 9(X')e)
= uh((aX + (1 - a)X')zh + (a0(X) + (1 - a)(9(X'))e).
Thus by monotonicity and by the definition of the map 0, 0(aX + (1 — a)X') <
a0(X) + (1 — a)0(X'), which proves convexity. So necessarily lim\^oo0(X) = oo.
Assumption 1 together with monotonicity implies that the rate of increase of
uh along the direction defined by e (or by any strictly positive vector) is uniformly
bounded below: 3e > 0 :| uh(x + 0e) - uh(x) |> 0.e,V0 e i?+,Vx G RN. Therefore
Uh(^zh + 9(X)e) = u° > uh(Xzh) + 0(A)e, so that uh(Xzh) < u° - 0(X)e. Note that
0(Xo) = 0 and 9(X) > 0 for A > Ao. I showed above that 0 is a convex function.
Therefore limx^oo0(X) = oo; since Uh(Xzh) < u° — 9(X)e then Umx^ocUh(Xzh) — —oo.
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It follows that zh G Gh for otherwise as we have seen limj^ooUh{z3h) < 0 contradicting
the fact that the utility levels of [z\, ..., z3H)j-\^... are positive.
Recall that for some g, limJ^ocug(zJg) —> oo. By Assumption 1, 3K > 0 :| ug(x) —
ug(y) |< K II x — y II Vx, y G Z?^. so that for any n and j | ug(z™) — ug(z™—je) \< K \\
je || . Since ug (zJg) —> oo. for every j there exists an rij such that ug(zgj —je) > j . Take
the sequence {zgJ} and relabel it {zJg}. Now consider the new sequence of allocations
{2j +fl^-j- zJg—je,.... "27/ + 7/~[} and call it also {zJh}h=i,2, ...,//• For eachj this defines
a feasible allocation and, by Assumption 1, along this sequence VTi, Uh{z3h) —• oo. In
particular V/?,. || z^ ||—• 9.
Define now C as the set of all strictly positive convex combinations of the vectors
z3hl||zJh|| for all h. Then either C is strictly contained in a half space, or it
defines a subspace of RN. Since £]/i=i zh ~ >^ ^ c a n n ° t be strictly contained in a
half space. Therefore C defines a subspace. In particular for any given g, 3A^ > 0
\/h such that (*)—zg = J2n=\^hzh- If o n e trader had indifference surfaces without
half lines (case (i)) then Gg = Gg and zg € Gg ==> zg G Gg, so that limited arbitrage
would contradict (*), because there can be no p such that (p,x) > 0 for x G G^ and
(p.x) > 0 for x G Gg. When instead for every closed sequence of indifferent vectors
the corresponding normals define a closed set, i.e. all preferences are in case (ii), then
the global cone G^ is open (Chichilnisky (1995)) so that Gch is a closed set, and the
set of directions in Gh is compact. On each direction of Gch the utility Uh achieves a
maximum by definition; therefore under the conditions on preferences there exists a
maximum utility level for Uh over all directions in Gch. Since along the sequence {z3h}
every trader's utility increases without bound, Vh3jh : j > jh => z3h G G^. However
J2h=i zi = 0, contradicting again limited arbitrage. In all cases the contradiction
arises from assuming that G(E) is not bounded, so that G(E) must be bounded.
Therefore under Assumption 1, limited arbitrage implies bounded gains from trade.
Observe that when all preferences are in case (ii) then Gh = Ah- In this case the
reciprocal is immediate: limited arbitrage is also necessary for bounded gains from
trade, completing the proof. •
The proof of the sufficiency in Proposition 4 above is valid for all preferences
satisfying Assumption 1, case (i) or case (ii), so that:
Corollary 1 For all economies with uniformly non-satiated preferences, limited ar-
bitrage implies bounded gains from traded
2.2 A Financial Interpretation of Limited Arbitrage
It is useful to explain the connection between limited arbitrage and the notion of
"'no-arbitrage" used in finance. The concepts are generally different, but in certain
cases they coincide. In the finance literature, arbitrage appears as a central concept.
Financial markets equilibrium is often defined as the absence of market arbitrage.
In Walrasian markets this is not the case. It may therefore appear that the two
literatures use different equilibrium concepts. Yet the link provided here draws a
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bridge between these two literatures. As shown below limited arbitrage, while not
an equilibrium concept, is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a Walrasian
equilibrium. In the following I will show the close link between the two concepts and
establish the bridge between the two equilibrium theories. I will provide examples
where the two concepts are identical, and others where they are different.
In financial markets an arbitrage opportunity exists when unbounded gains can be
made at no cost, or, equivalently, by taking no risks. Consider, for example, buying
an asset in a market where its price is low while simultaneously selling it at another
where its price is high: this can lead to unbounded gains at no risk to the trader.
No-arbitrage means that such opportunities do not exist, and it provides a standard
framework for pricing a financial asset: precisely so that no arbitrage opportunities
should arise between this and other related assets. Since trading does not cease until
all arbitrage opportunities are extinguished, at a market clearing equilibrium there
must be no-arbitrage.
The simplest illustration of the link between limited arbitrage and no-arbitrage
is an economy E where the traders' initial endowments are zero, O/j = 0 for h = 1,2,
and the set of gradients to indifference surfaces are closed. Here no-arbitrage at the
initial endowments means that there are no trades which could increase the traders'
utilities at zero cost: gains from trade in E must be zero. By contrast, E has limited
arbitrage when no trader can increase utility beyond a given bound at zero cost; as
seen above, gains from trade are bounded.
In brief: no-arbitrage requires that there should be no gains from trade at zero cost
while limited arbitrage requires that there should be only bounded utility arbitrage
or limited gains from trade.
Now consider a particular case of the same example: when the traders' utilities
are denned by linear real valued functions. Then the two concepts coincide: there is
limited arbitrage if and only if there is no-arbitrage as defined in finance. In brief: in
linear economies, limited arbitrage "collapses" into no-arbitrage.
In general, the two concepts are related but nonetheless different: no-arbitrage is
a market clearing condition used to describe an allocation at which there is no further
reason to trade. It can be applied at the initial allocations, but then it means that
there is no reason for trade in the economy as a whole: the economy is autarchic and
therefore not very interesting. By contrast, limited arbitrage is applied only to the
economy's initial data, the traders' endowments and preferences. Limited arbitrage
does not imply that the economy is autarchic; quite to the contrary, it is valuable in
predicting whether the economy can ever reach a competitive equilibrium. It allows
to do so by examining the economy's initial conditions.
2.3 Examples of markets with and without limited arbitrage
Example 1 Figures 4 and 5 above illustrate an economy with two traders trading
in X = R2; in Figure 4 the market cones intersect and the economy has limited
arbitrage. In Figure 5 the market cones do not intersect and the economy does not
have limited arbitrage. Figure 6 below illustrates three traders trading in X = R3;
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each two market cones intersect, but the three market cones do not intersect, and the
economy violates limited arbitrage. This figure illustrates the fact that the union of
the market cones may fail to be contractible: indeed, this failure corresponds to the
failure of the market cones to intersect, as proven in Chichilnisky (1993c).
Figure 6. Three traders in R3. Every two traders's subeconomy has limited
arbitrage but the whole economy does not.
Example 2 When the consumption set is X = R+, limited arbitrage is always sat-
isfied if all indifference surfaces through positive consumption bundles are contained
in the interior of X, R++. Examples of such preferences are those given by Cobb-
Douglas utilities, or by utilities with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) with
elasticity of substitution a <1. This is because all such preferences have as global
cone the positive orthant (or its closure), and therefore their market cones always
intersect. These preferences are very similar to each other on choices involving large
utility levels: this is a form of similarity of preferences. Economies where the in-
dividuals ' initial endowments are strictly interior to the consumption set X always
satisfy the limited arbitrage condition in the case X = R+, since in this case V7i,
R%+ C D+(nh) for all h=l,..., H.
Example 3 When X = R1^ the limited arbitrage condition may fail to be satisfied
when some trader's endowment vector 0,^ is in the boundary of the consumption space,
8R+, and at all supporting prices in S(E) some trader has zero income, i.e. when
Vp € 5(E) 3h such that (p,£lh) = 0- In this case, S(E) C N. This case is illustrated in
Figure 7 below; it is a rather general case which may occur in economies with many
individuals and with many commodities. When all individuals have positive income
at some price p € S(E), then limited arbitrage is always satisfied since by definition
in this case V7i, = ^ + + C D^(Qi) for all h = 1,..., H.
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Figure 7. Limited arbitrage fails. Trader two owns only one good, to which the
other trader is indifferent.
Example 4 A competitive equilibrium may exist even when some traders have zero
income, showing that Arrow's "resource relatedness" condition (Arrow and Hahn
(1971)) is sufficient but not necessary for existence of an equilibrium. Figure 8 below
illustrates an economy where at all supporting prices some trader has zero income:
Vp £ S(E) 3h such that (p,O^) = 0, i.e. S(E) C N; in this economy, however, limited
arbitrage is satisfied so that a competitive equilibrium exists. The initial allocation
and a price vector assigning value zero to the second good defines such an equilibrium.
u 2
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Figure 8. Equilibrium exists even when one trader has zero income
3 Limited Arbitrage and the Compactness of the Pareto
Frontier
The Pareto frontier P(E) is the set of feasible, efficient and individually rational
utility allocations. With H traders it is a subset of i?+. Proving the boundedness
and closedness of the Pareto frontier is a crucial step in establishing the existence of
a competitive equilibrium and the non-emptiness of the core. The main theorem of
this section shows that limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for this.
There is a novel feature of the results which are presented here, a feature which
is shared which those that were previously established in Chichilnisky (1991, 1992,
1994. 1995, 1995a, 1996a) and Chichilnisky and Heal (1992, 1996). It starts from the
observation that the compactness of the Pareto frontier need not imply the compact-
ness of the set of feasible commodity allocations. The Pareto frontier is defined in
utility space, R+ while the commodity allocations are in the product of the commod-
ity space with itself, XH. When X = RN, the commodity allocations are in RHxN.
This observation is useful to distinguish the results presented here, in Chichilnisky
(1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1995a, 1996a) and Chichilnisky and Heal (1992, 1996) from
others in the literature. Other conditions used in the literature which are sufficient
for the existence of an equilibrium and the core ensure that—with or without short
sales—the set of individually rational and feasible commodity allocations is compact,
see e.g. Chichilnisky and Heal (1993) Werner (1987) and Koutsougeras (1993) among
others; the latter proves in detail that Werner's 1987 no-arbitrage condition, based
on recession cones, implies the compactness of the set of feasible and individually
rational allocations unless preferences are linear. But as already observed, and as
is shown below, the boundedness of the set of feasible commodity allocations is not
needed for existence. Indeed, such boundedness is not used in this paper, nor was it
used in the results of Chichilnisky (1991, 1992, 1994, 1994a, 1995, 1995,1996a) and
Chichilnisky and Heal (1992, 1996): these are the first results in the literature proving
the existence of equilibrium and the non-emptiness of the core in economies where
limited arbitrage holds and the set of feasible and individually rational allocations is
generally unbounded. In addition, of course, these results establish conditions which
are simultaneously necessary and sufficient for the existence of equilibrium and the
core, another novel feature. As a result, here the set of all possible efficient alloca-
tions, the contract curve, and the set of possible equilibria and the set of all possible
core allocations, may be unbounded sets. Next we review some examples to illustrate
and better appreciate the nature of the problems that can arise.
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Common asymptote
Figure 9. The Pareto frontier may fail to be closed even in finite dimensions
Example 5 Figure 9 shows that the Pareto frontier may fail to be closed even in
finite dimensional models, provided the consumption set is the whole Euclidean space.
It shows two traders with indifference curves having the line y = —x as asymptote.
Consumption sets are the whole space and feasible allocations are those which sum to
zero. Utility functions are U{ = Xi + yi ± e~(Xi~Vi\i = 1,2. Limited arbitrage rules
out such cases.
Example 6 Another example is a two-agent economy where both agents have linear
preferences: if the preferences are different the set of feasible utility allocations is
unbounded. Of course, limited arbitrage rules out such situations.
Example 7 Even when the consumption set is bounded below, but the commodity
space is infinite dimensional, examples can be provided where the Pareto frontier is
not closed.36
Theorem 1 Consider an economy E as defined in Section 1. Then limited arbi-
trage is necessary and sufficient for the compactness of the Pareto frontier.37
Proof. This result always holds when the consumption set is bounded below by
some vector in the space,38 and in that case it is proved using standard arguments,
see e.g. Arrow and Harm (1971). Therefore in the following I concentrate in the case
where X is unbounded.
Sufficiency first. Recall that by definition P(E) C U(E) C R+. Proposition 4 and
Corollary 1 proved that U(E) is bounded when limited arbitrage is satisfied, so that
P(E) is bounded also.
The next step is to prove that F(E) is closed when limited arbitrage is satisfied.
Consider a sequence of allocations {z£}j=i,2..., /i = 1,2,..., H, satisfying Vj, Ylh=i zh —
O. and limj-^oo YLh=\ zh = ^- Assume that (u\(z{), ...,UH{ZJH)) C R+ converges to a
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utility allocation v = (vi...., vH) £ # + . which is undominated by the utility allocation
of any other feasible allocation. Observe that the vector v may or not be the utility
vector of a feasible allocation: when limited arbitrage is satisfied. I will prove that it
is. The result is immediate if the set of feasible allocations is bounded; therefore I
concentrate in the case where the set of feasible allocations is not bounded.
Let M be the set of all traders h E {1,2 . , , , / f} , for whom the corresponding
sequence of allocations {z3h}j=\^... is bounded, i.e. h £ M <=> 3Kh : \\zJh\\ < Kh < oo;
let J be its complement, J = {1, 2,..., H} — M, which I assume to be non empty. There
exists a subsequence of the original sequence of allocations, which for simplicity is
denoted also {-z£}j=i,2...i h = 1,2,..., H, along which V/i E M, the \iuij{zJh}j=ij2... = zh
exists, and YlheM zh +Iini7-_HX> J^heJ zh = ^- R-eca^ that by Proposition 2 the cones
Gh are uniform, so that we may translate the origin of the space without loss of
generality. Therefore we may assume without loss that ^heMzh — ^ i-e- that
linij^oo YlheJ zh ~ Q- ^ o r e a c n h £ J, consider the normalized sequence {-^-l}J=i,2...,
which is contained in a compact space, the unit ball. A convergent subsequence of
Z3 zj
this always exists, and is denoted also {—th}j=\^...- Let Zh = \\m.j{—f-}. We showed
in Proposition 4 that, under the conditions, V/i E J, Zh € Gh- If V/i £ J, Zh £ Gh then
by Proposition 2 eventually the utility values of the traders attain their limit for all
h. the utility vector v is achieved by a feasible allocation and the proof is complete.
It remains therefore to consider only the case where for some trader g € J, zg € Gg.
Define now the convex cone C of all strictly positive linear combinations of the
vectors {zh}h£j,C = {w = YlheJ ^hZhi^h > 0}. There are two mutually exclusive
and exhaustive cases: either (a) the cone C is contained strictly in a half-space of
RN, or (b) the cone C is a subspace of RN. By construction lirn^oo ^2heJ zh = ^'
which eliminates case (a). Therefore (b) must hold, and C is a subspace of RN. In
particular, — zg EC, i.e. V/i € JBA^ > 0 such that
-zg = J2\hZh- (8)
The final step is to show that (8) contradicts limited arbitrage. By limited arbitrage
3p £ C\hDh s.t. (p, zg) > 0, because zg £ Gg, and V/i £ J, (p, Zh) > 0, since Zh E Gh.
Therefore (p, YlheJ zh) — ^' w m c n contradicts (8). Since the contradiction arises from
assuming that the Pareto frontier P(E) is not closed, -P(E) must be closed. Therefore
limited arbitrage implies a compact Pareto frontier.
Necessity is established next. If limited arbitrage fails, there is no vector y E H
such that (y, Zh) > 0 for all {zh} E Gh. Equivalently, there exist a set J consisting of
at least two traders and, for each h £ J, a vector zh E Gh such that YIHGJ zh — 0- Then
by Proposition 2 either for some h, Zh E Ah so that the Pareto frontier is unbounded
and therefore not compact, or else for some h, Zh E dGh H Gh and therefore the
Pareto frontier is not closed, and therefore not compact either. In either case, the
Pareto frontier is not compact when limited arbitrage fails. Therefore compactness
is necessary for limited arbitrage. •
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Proposition 5 When X = RN, limited arbitrage implies that the Pareto frontier
PfE) is homeomorphic to a simplex.39
Proof. This follows from Theorem 1 and by the convexity of preferences, cf. Arrow
and Hahn (1971). •
4 Competitive Equilibrium and Limited Arbitrage
This section establishes the main result linking the existence of a competitive equi-
librium with the condition of limited arbitrage.40 The result is that limited arbi-
trage is simultaneously necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive
equilibrium,41 and it was established first in Chichilnisky (1991, 1992, 1994a, 1995,
1996a). Other noteworthy features are: the equivalence between limited arbitrage
and equilibrium applies equally to economies with or without short sales, and with or
without strictly convex preferences. It therefore includes the Arrow Debreu market
which has no short sales, a classic case which was neglected previously in the liter-
ature on no-arbitrage conditions. In addition, the equivalence applies to economies
where the set of feasible and individually rational allocations may be unbounded, a
case which has also been neglected in the literature.42 Finally, the equivalence be-
tween limited arbitrage and equilibrium extends to economies with infinitely many
markets, see Chichilnisky and Heal (1992, 1993) and the next Section.
The result presented below was established first in Chichilnisky (1991, 1992,
1994a, 1995) for uniformly non-satiated convex preferences which are either all in
case (i) e.g. strictly convex, or in case (ii), e.g. they have indifference surfaces with
a closed set of gradient directions. The result presented here extends these earlier
results in that it deals in a unified way with non-satiated convex preferences; in the
same economy there may be a mixture of preferences of type (i) and (ii), see also
Chichilnisky (1995a, 1996a):
Theorem 2 Consider an economy E = {X, Uh,Qh, h = 1,..., i / } , where H > 2, with
X = RN or X = R1^ and N > 1 . Then the following two properties are equivalent:
(i) The economy E has limited arbitrage
(ii) The economy E has a competitive equilibrium
Proof. Necessity first. Consider first the case X = RN and assume without loss
of generality that Qh = 0 for all h. The proof is by contradiction. Let p* be an
equilibrium price and let x* = (x\, •••x*H) be the corresponding equilibrium allocation.
Then if limited arbitrage does not hold, 3h and v G Gh such that (p*,v) < 0, so that
VA > 0, Xv is affordable at prices p*. However, Gh is the same at any endowment by
Proposition 2. It follows that 3A > 0 : Uh{x*h 4- Xv) > Uh{x*h), which contradicts the
fact that x*h is an equilibrium allocation. This completes the proof of necessity when
X = RN.
Consider next X = R%. Assume that Vg <G 5(E) 3 h G {1, . . . ,#} such that
(q, Qh) — 0- Then if limited arbitrage is not satisfied f)h=i ^h(^h) = 0, which implies
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that Vp € RN. 3h and v(p) G Gh(Qh):
(p,\v(p)) < 0, VA > 0 (9)
I will now show that this implies that a competitive equilibrium price cannot exist.
By contradiction. Let p* be an equilibrium price and x* G XH be the corresponding
equilibrium allocation. Consider v(p*) € (^(O/J satisfying (9). If lim^-*oo uh(^h +
Xv(p)) — oo this leads directly to a contradiction, because (p*, \v(p*)) < 0, so that
for all A. Au(p*) is affordable, and therefore there is no affordable allocation which
maximizes h's utility at the equilibrium price p*. Consider next the case where
v(p*) € GT^O/J — A^flh). By definition, u^fl^ + Xv(p*)) never ceases to increase in
A, and liniA^oo Uh(^h + Av(p*)) < oo. If uh(x*h) > limA^oo Uh(^h + Av(p*) then there
exists a vector, namely x*h, which has utility strictly larger than v(p*) £ dGhiQh) so
that, as shown in Proposition 2, the direction defined by the vector x* — flh must be
contained in A^fl^). But this contradicts the assumption that x*h is an equilibrium
allocation, because if x* — fl^ € Ah(£lh), limA—oo Uh(flh + ^(xh ~ Qh)) — °°) while
(p*. X(x^l — Qfl)) < 0 so that x*h cannot be an equilibrium allocation. Therefore limited
arbitrage is also necessary for the existence of a competitive equilibrium in this case.
It remains to consider the case where 3p G S(E) such that V/i£ {1,..., / / } , (p, fl^) ^
0. But in this case by definition f|£=i Dt(^h) ± 0 since Mh <E {1...H}, R^+ C
D^(Qh), so that limited arbitrage is always satisfied when an equilibrium exists.
This completes the proof of necessity.
Sufficiency next. The proof uses the fact that the Pareto frontier is homeomorphic
to a simplex. When X = R+ the Pareto frontier of the economy P(E) is always home-
omorphic to a simplex, see Arrow and Hahn (1971). In the case X = RN this may
fail. However, by Theorem 1 above, if the economy satisfies limited arbitrage then
the Pareto frontier is compact; under the assumptions on preferences, it is then also
homeomorphic to a simplex (Arrow and Hahn (1971)). Therefore in both cases, P(E)
is homeomorphic to a simplex and one can apply the by now standard Negishi method
of using a fixed point argument on the Pareto frontier to establish the existence of
a pseudoequilibrium.43 It remains however to prove that the pseudoequilibrium is
also a competitive equilibrium.
To complete the proof of existence of a competitive equilibrium consider first
X = RN. Then V7i = 1,..., H there exists an allocation in X of strictly lower value
than the pseudoequilibrium x*h at the price p*. Therefore by Lemma 3, Chapter 4,
page 81 of Arrow and Hahn (1971), the quasi-equilibrium (p*, x*) is also a competitive
equilibrium, completing the proof of existence when X = RN.
Next consider X = R+, and a quasi-equilibrium (p*,x*) whose existence was
already established. If every individual has a positive income at p*, i.e. V7i, (p*, Qh) >
0. then by Lemma 3, Chapter 4 of Arrow and Hahn (1971) the quasi-equilibrium
(p*, x*) is also a competitive equilibrium, completing the proof. Furthermore, observe
that in any case the pseudoequilibrium price p* € S(E), so that 5(E) is not empty. To
prove existence we consider therefore two cases: first the case where 3q* 6 5(E) : V/i,
(q*, Qh) > 0. In this case, by the above remarks from Arrow and Hahn (1971), (q*, x*)
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is a competitive equilibrium. The second case is when Vg G 5(E), 3/i G {1,...,//} such
that (q.Qh) — 0. Limited arbitrage then implies:
3q* G 5(E) : V/i, ( g » > 0 for all v G G^ffo). (10)
Let .r* = x\. ...,x*H G XH be a feasible allocation in T supported by the vector q*
defined in (10): by definition, \/h, Ufl(xJl) > uh(Qh) and q* supports x*. Note that
any h minimizes costs at x*h because q* is a support. Furthermore x*h is affordable
under q*. Therefore, (q*,x*) can fail to be a competitive equilibrium only when for
some h, (q*, x*h) = 0, for otherwise the cost minimizing allocation is always also utility
maximizing in the budget set Bh(q*) = {w G X : (q*, w) = (q*, fin)}-
It remains therefore to prove existence when (q*,x*h) = 0 for some h. Since by
the definition of S(E), x* is individually rational, i.e. V7i, Uhix^) > Uh(Clh), then
{q*,x*h) = 0 implies (q*,Qh) — 0, because by definition q* is a supporting price
for the equilibrium allocation x*. If V/i, Uh{x*h) = 0 then x*h G dR+, and by the
monotonicity and quasi-concavity of Uh, any vector y in the budget set defined by
the price p*, Bh(q*), must also satisfy Uh(y) = 0, so that x*h maximizes utility in
Bh(q*)^ which implies that (q*,x*) is a competitive equilibrium. Therefore (q*,x*) is
a competitive equilibrium unless for some h, Uh(x*h) > 0.
Assume therefore that the quasiequilibrium (q*,x*) is not a competitive equilib-
rium, and that for some h with (q*,Qh) = ®iuh(xh) > 0. Since Uh{x*h) > 0 and x*h
G 6R+ then an indifference surface of a commodity bundle of positive utility Uh(x*h)
intersects dR1^ at x^ G dR^_. Let r be the ray in dR^_containing x*h. If w G r then
(q*,w) = 0, because {q*,x*h) = 0. Since n^(a:^) > 0, by Proposition 3 Uh strictly
increases along r, so that w G Gh{x^). But this contradicts the choice of q* as a
supporting price satisfying limited arbitrage (10) since
3h and w G Gh(Clh) such that {q*, w) = 0. (11)
The contradiction between (11) and (10) arose from the assumption that (q*,x*) is
not a competitive equilibrium, so that (q*,x*) must be a competitive equilibrium,
and the proof is complete. •
5 Economies with Infinitely Many Markets
The results of Theorem 2 are also valid for infinitely many markets. As already seen,
the existence of inner products is useful in defining limited arbitrage. For this reason
and because of the natural structure of prices in Hilbert spaces, I work on a Hilbert
space of commodities in which inner products are defined.
5.1 Hilbert Spaces and the Cone Condition
All Hilbert spaces have positive orthants with empty interior. This can make things
difficult when seeking to prove the existence of an equilibrium, which depends on find-
ing supporting prices for efficient allocations. Supporting prices are usually found by
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applying the Hahn-Banach theorem, and without such prices a competitive equi-
librium does not exist. Therefore the Hahn Banach theorem is crucial for proving
existence of an equilibrium. However this theorem requires that the convex set being
supported has a non-empty interior, a condition which is never satisfied within the
positive orthant of a Hilbert space. This problem, which is typical in infinite dimen-
sional spaces, was solved in 1980 by Chichilnisky and Kalman (1980) who introduced
a condition on preferences, the cone condition (C-K.) and proved that it is nec-
essary and sufficient for separating convex sets with or without non-empty interior,
thus extending Hahn-Banach's theorem to encompass all convex sets, whether or not
they have an empty interior. Since its introduction the C-K cone condition has
been used extensively to prove the existence of a market equilibrium and in game
theory; it is now a standard condition of economies with infinitely many markets and
is known also under the name of "properness", cf. Chichilnisky (1993a).
In addition to the cone condition, one more result is needed to extend directly
the proof of Theorem 2 to economies with infinitely many markets: the compactness
of the Pareto frontier. Recall that this frontier is always a finite dimensional object
when there are a finite number of traders: it is contained in R+, where H is the
number of traders.
5.2 Limited Arbitrage and the Cone Condition
A somewhat unexpected result is that limited arbitrage implies the C-K cone con-
dition, see Chichilnisky and Heal (1992, 1995). Because of this, limited arbitrage is
necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and the core,
with or without short sales, in the infinite dimensional space H. Limited arbitrage
therefore unifies the treatment of finitely and infinitely many markets.
Consider an economy E as defined in Section 2 except that here X = H or X = H+;
more general convex sets can be considered as well, see (Chichilnisky and Heal 1992,
1995). The global cones and the market cones, and the limited arbitrage condition,
are the same as defined in the finite dimensional cases when X = RN and X = R±
respectively. To shorten the presentation, here the market cones are assumed to
be uniform across initial endowments, a condition which is automatically satisfied
under Assumption 1 when X = H, and which is not needed for the main results, cf.
Chichilnisky and Heal (1992, 1995). Therefore here either limited is satisfied at every
endowment or not at all. The results on existence of an equilibrium presented below
are due to Chichilnisky and Heal (1992, 1995).
Definition 9 The cone defined by a convex set D C X at a point x G D is C(D, x) =
{z G X : 2 = x + X(y — x), where A > 0 and y G D}.
Definition 10 A convex set D C X satisfies the C-K cone condition of (Chichilnisky
and Kalman, 1980) at x GD when there exists a vector v GX which is at positive dis-
tance s(D,x) from the cone with vertex x defined by the set D,C(D,x).
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Definition 11 A preference u^ : X —> R satisfies the C-K cone condition of
Chichilnisky and Kalman (1980^ when for every x GX, the preferred set uxh — {y :
uh(y) > uh(x)} C X ofuh atx satisfies the C-K condition, ande{Px,x) is independent
of x.
The finite dimensional proofs work for infinite dimensions when X is a Hilbert
space H, see Chichilnisky and Heal (1992, 1995). The only case which requires special
treatment is X — H+ because with infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces the positive
orthant H+ has empty interior:
Theorem 3 (Chichilnisky and Heal) Consider an economy E as defined in Section 2,
where the trading space is either X = H+, or X = H, and where H is a Hilbert space
of finite or infinite dimensions. Then limited arbitrage implies the C-K (Chichilnisky
and Kalman 1980) cone condition. In particular, the second welfare theorem applies
under limited arbitrage: a Pareto efficient allocation is also a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. For a proof see Chichilnisky and Heal (1992, 1995). An outline of the proof
for X = H+ follows. The case X = H is in Chichilnisky and Heal (1992 and 1995)
and follows directly from the finite dimensional case.
Let X = H+: I will show first that limited arbitrage, as defined in Section 2,
implies that there exists a vector p 7^  0 in S(E). The proof is by contradiction. If ~
3p 7^  0 in S(E), then the intersection of the dual cones in Definition 6 must be empty,
i.e. C]^=1D^ = 0 : this occurs either because for some /i, the set D^ = D^ D S(E)
is empty, or alternatively because the set •S'(E) itself is empty. In either case this
leads to a contradiction with limited arbitrage which requires that nff^D^ ^ 0.
Since the contradiction arises from assuming that ~ 3p 7^  0 in S(E), it follows that
3p € S(E),p 7^  0, i.e. the preferred set of u^ can be supported by a non-zero pricep
at some Xh which is part of a feasible affordable efficient and individually rational
allocation, x = xi,..., XH-
The last step is to show that there exists one vector v, the same for all traders,
which is at a positive distance e from C(u^,x) for every trader h as well as for
every x £ X Consider now the vector v = Ylh=iPh<i where ph is the support whose
existence was established above, and let e = min^i^,. . . , / /!^}- The vector v satisfies
the definition of the cone condition C-K.45 •
Theorem 4 (Chichilnisky and Heal) Consider an economy E as defined in Section 2,
where X = H, or X = H+, where H is a Hilbert space of finite or infinite dimensions.
Then limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the compactness of the Pareto
frontier.
Proof. Since the cone condition holds, the proof is a straightforward extension of
Theorem 1 which holds for the finite dimensional case. See Chichilnisky and Heal
(1992 ,1995). •
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Theorem 5 (Chichilnisky and Heal) Consider an economy E as defined in Section
2, where X = H+ or X = H. a Hilbert. space of finite or infinite dimensions. Then
limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilib-
rium.
Proof. The proof is similar to that for the finite dimensional case, see Chichilnisky
and Heal (1992,1995). •
5.3 Subeconomies with Competitive Equilibria
The condition of limited arbitrage need not be tested on all traders simultaneously:
in the case of RN, it needs only be satisfied on subeconomies with no more traders
than the number of commodities in the economy,46 N, plus one.
Definition 12 A k—trader sub-economy ofE is an economy F consisting of a subset
of k < H traders in E, each with the endowments and preferences as in E: F =
{X, uh} Qh} h € J C {1,..., H}, cardinality (J) = k < H}.
Theorem 6 The following four properties of an economy E with trading space RN
are equivalent:
(i) E has a competitive equilibrium
(ii) Every sub economy of E with at most TV + 1 traders has a competitive equi-
librium
(iii) E has limited arbitrage
(iv) E has limited arbitrage for any subset of traders with no more that N -f 1
members.
Proof. Theorem 1 implies (i)«=>(iii) and (ii)-<=>(iv). That (iii)^(iv) follows from the
following theorem which is a corollary in Chichilnisky (1993c): Consider a family
{Ui}i=i...H of convex sets in RN, H, N > 1. Then
H
f] Ut ^  0 if and only if f| U{ ^ 0
for any subset of indices J C {I...H} having at most iV -f 1 elements.
In particular, an economy E as denned in Section 2 satisfies limited arbitrage, if and
only if it satisfies limited arbitrage for any subset of k = N + 1 traders, where TV is
the number of commodities in the economy E. •
6 Limited Arbitrage Equilibrium and The Core with Fi-
nitely or Infinitely Many Markets
Limited arbitrage is also necessary and sufficient for the nonemptiness of the core:44
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Theorem 7 Consider an economy E = {X,uh,Qh,h = 1,....//}, where H > 2.
X — RN and N > 1, or X is a Hilbert space H. Then the following three properties
are equivalent:
(i) The economy E has limited arbitrage
(ii)The economy E has a core
(Hi) Every subeconomy of E with at most N + 1 trades has a core
Proof. For the proof of (i)<£>(ii) and a discussion of the literature see Chichilnisky
(1996).45
The equivalence (i)<=>(iii) then follows from Theorem 6. •
7 Social Diversity and the Supercore
The supercore was defined and motivated in Section 1.2. It measures the extent
to which a society has reasons to stay together. Social diversity comes in many
shades, one of which, the mildest possible, will be used to establish the existence of
a supercore:
Definition 13 An economy E is socially diverse when it does not satisfy limited
arbitrage. When X = RN, this means:
When X = %
h=\
= RNIn this section short sales are allowed, so that the trading space is X  . To
simplify notation I assume without loss of generality that all endowments are zero,
VTi, flh = 0. Assume now that the normalized gradients of closed sets of indifferent
vectors define closed sets (case (ii)) so that48 G^ = A^.
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Definition 14 E has social diversity of type 1, or SD1. when all sub economies with
at most H — 1 traders have limited arbitrage, but E does not.
Theorem 8 Consider an economy E with at least three traders. Then i/E has social
diversity of type 1, SD1. its supercore is not empty.
Proof. To simplify notation, assume without loss of generality that V7i, O^ = 0.
Since the economy has social diversity of type 1, every subeconomy of H — 1 traders
satisfies limited arbitrage, which by Proposition 4 implies that gains from trade G(E)
are bounded in every H — 1 trader subeconomy. In particular, there is a maximum
level of utility which each trader can obtain by him or herself, and the same is true
for any subgroup consisting of at most H — 1 traders.
However, by Proposition 4, gains from trade cannot be bounded in E for the set
of all H traders, since E does not satisfy limited arbitrage. •
8 Limited Arbitrage and Social Choice
Limited arbitrage is also crucial for achieving resource allocation via social choice.
Two main approaches to social choice are studied here. One is Arrow's: his axioms
of social choice require that the social choice rule <I> be non-dictatorial, independent
of irrelevant alternatives, and satisfy a Pareto condition (Arrow (1951)). A second
approach requires, instead, that the rule <£ be continuous, anonymous, and respect
unanimity, Chichilnisky (1980 and 1982). Both approaches have led to corresponding
impossibility results (Arrow 1951, Chichilnisky (1980,1982)). Though the two sets
of axioms are quite different, it has been shown recently that the impossibility re-
sults which emerge from them are equivalent, see Baryshnikov (1993). Furthermore,
as is shown below, limited arbitrage is closely connected with both sets of axioms.
Economies which satisfy limited arbitrage admit social choice rules with either set
of axioms. Therefore, in a well denned sense, the social choice problem can only be
solved in those economies which satisfy limited arbitrage.
How do we allocate resources by social choice? Social choice rules assign a social
preference <&(U\...UH) to each list (u\...un) of individual preferences of an economy
E.46 The social preference ranks allocations in RNxH, and allows to select an optimal
feasible allocation. This is the resource allocation obtained via social choice.
The procedure requires, of course, that a social choice rule $ exists: the role of
limited arbitrage is important because it ensures existence. This will be established
below. I prove here that limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for resolving
Arrow's paradox when the domain of individual preferences are those in the economy,
and the choices are those feasible allocations which give large utility value.47
Limited arbitrage provides a restriction on the relationship between individual
preferences under which social choice rules exist. A brief background on the matter
of preference diversity follows.
Arrow's impossibility theorem established that in general a social choice rule 3>
does not exist: the problem of social choice has no solution unless individual prefer-
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ences are restricted. Duncan Black (1948) established that the "single peakedness"
of preferences is a sufficient restriction to obtain majority rules. Using different ax-
ioms, Chichilnisky (1980 and 1982) established also that a social choice rule 3> does
not generally exist; subsequently Chichilnisky and Heal (1983) established a neces-
sary and sufficient restriction for the resolution of the social choice paradox: the
contractibility of the space of preferences.48 Contractibility can be interpreted as a
limitation on preference diversity, Heal (1983). In all cases, therefore, the problem
of social choice is resolved by restricting the diversity of individual preferences. The
main result in this section is that the restriction on individual preferences required
to solve the problem is precisely limited arbitrage. The connection between limited
arbitrage and contractibility is discussed below.
The section is organized as follows. First I show in Proposition 6 that the economy
E satisfies limited arbitrage if and only if it contains no Condorcet cycles on choices of
large utility values.49 Condorcet cycles are the building blocks of Arrow's impossibility
theorem, and are at the root of the social choice problem. On the basis of Proposition
6, I prove in Theorem 9 that limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for resolving
Arrow's paradox on allocations of large utility values.
Definition 15 A Condorcet cycle is a collection of three preferences over a choice
set X, represented by three utilities Ui : X —> R, i = 1,2,3, and three choices a, f3, 7
within a feasible set Y C X such that u\(a) > u\{(3) > 1x1(7), U2{l) > ^2 (a) > ^2(/3)
and u3({3) > 143(7) > v*(a).
Within an economy with finite resources fl » 0, the social choice problem is
about the choice of allocations of these resources. Choices are in X = RNxH.
An allocation (X\...XH) € RNxH is feasible if YLixi — ^ = 0. Consider an econ-
omy E as defined in Section 2. Preferences over private consumption are increas-
ing, Uh{x) > Uh(y) if x > y £ RN, utilities are uniformly non-satiated (Assump-
tion 1), and indifference surfaces which are not bounded below have a closed set of
gradients,50 so that G^ = Ah. While the preferences in E are defined over private
consumption, they naturally define preference over allocations, as follows: define
uh(x\...xi{) > uh{yi...yn) •<=> v>h(xh) > uh(yh). Thus the preferences in the economy
E induce naturally preferences over the feasible allocations in E.
Definition 16 The family of preferences {U\...UH}, Uh : RN —>• R of an economy E
has a Condorcet cycle of size k if for every three preferences u^u^u^ G {u\...Ufj}
there exists three feasible allocations ak = (a^a^a^) £ X3xH C R3xNxH;6k =
(j3k,f32,P^) and j k = (71,72173) which define a Condorcet cycle, and such that each




The following shows that limited arbitrage eliminates Condorcet cycles on matters
of great importance, namely on those with utility level approaching the supremum
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of the utilities, which for simplicity and without loss of generality we have assumed
to be oo :
Proposition 6 Let E be a market economy with short sales (X — RN) and H >
3 traders. Then E has social diversity if and only if its traders' preferences have
Condorcet cycles of every size. Equivalently, E has limited arbitrage if and only for
some k > 0. the traders' preferences have no Condorcet cycles of size larger than k.
Proof. Consider an economy with Condorcet cycles of all sizes. For each k > 0,
there exists three allocations denoted (ak,f3k,~fk) € R3xNxH and three traders
uj^.u^. i43 C {U\...UH} which define a Condorcet triple of size k. By definition,
for every /c, each of the three allocations is feasible, for example, ak = (ak,..., cxkH) £
RN*H. and E£i(ci?) = 0. Furthermore mmh=i,..MKK)A(Ph)>M'yh)]} > *,
so that e.g. lim^oo (U^(Q^)) = oo. There exist therefore a sequence of allocations
(0M* = l,2... = ( ^ - . v 0 k ) * = l , 2 . ^
oo. This implies that E has unbounded gains from trade, which contradicts Proposi-
tion 3. Therefore E cannot have Condorcet cycles of every size.
Conversely, if E has no limited arbitrage, for any k > 0, there exist a feasible
allocation (a*, a^, •••, a^-), such that J2h=iah — ^' anc* ^ uh(ah) — ^- For each
integer k > 0, and for a small enough e > 0 define now the vector A = (e,..., e) <G RJ+
and the following three allocations: ak — {ka\, ka\ — 2A, /cct3+2A, ka\,..., kakH), j3k =
(kak - A, ka.2, ka^+A, ka\,..., kakH) and -yk = (fcaf-2A, fca^-A, fca3+3A, fcaj, ..kakH).
Each allocation is feasible, e.g. kak + ka% — 2A 4- ka% + 2A + ka\ + ... 4- fca^ =
^(Ylh=i ah) — 0- Furthermore for each k > 0 sufficiently large, the three allocations
a
k
, j3k, 7^ and the traders h = 1, 2, 3, define a Condorcet cycle of size k : all traders
except for 1, 2, 3, are indifferent between the three allocations and they reach a utility
value at least fc, while trader 1 prefers ak to j3k to 7*\ trader 3 prefers *yk to ak to
3k, and trader 2 prefers 0k to 7^ to ak. Observe that this construction can be made
for any three traders within the set {1, 2,..., H}. This completes the proof. •
The next result uses Proposition 6 to establish the connection between limited
arbitrage and Arrow's theorem. Consider Arrow's three axioms: Pareto, indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship. The social choice problem is
to find a social choice rule $ : P3' —*• P from individual to social preferences satisfying
Arrow's three axioms; the domain for the rule $ are profiles of individual preferences
over allocations of the economy E: $ : pi —• P. Recall that each preference in the
economy E defines a preference over feasible allocations in E.
Definition 17 The economy E admits a resolution of Arrow's paradox if for any
number of voters j > 3 there exists a social choice function from the space P =
{ui ,...,UH} of preferences of the economy E into the space Q of complete transitive
preference defined on the space of feasible allocations of E, <fr : P3 —> Q, satisfying
Arrow's three axioms.
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Definition 18 A feasible allocation (a*, ...,akH) £ RNxH has utility value k. or sim-
ply value k, if each trader achieves at least a. utility level k :
{ [ { ( { ) , , t f ( & ) ] }
heH
Definition 19 Arrow's paradox is said to be resolved on choices of large utility value
in the economy E when for all j > 3 there exists social choice function <P : P^ —> Q
and a k > 0 such that $ is defined on all profiles of j preferences in E, and it satisfies
Arrow's three axioms when restricted to allocations of utility value exceeding k.bl
Theorem 9 Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for a resolution of Arrow's
paradox on choices of large utility value in the economy E.
Proof. Necessity follows from Proposition 6, since by Arrow's axiom of independence
of irrelevant alternatives, the existence of one Condorcet triple of size k suffices to
produce Arrow's impossibility theorem on feasible choices of value k in our domain of
preferences, see Arrow (1951). Sufficiency is immediate: limited arbitrage eliminates
feasible allocation of large utility value by Proposition 1, because it bounds gains from
trade. Therefore it resolves Arrow's paradox, because this is automatically resolved
in an empty domain of choices. •
8.1 Social choice rules which are continuous, anonymous and respect
unanimity
Consider now the second approach to social choice, Chichilnisky (1980, 1982), which
seeks continuous anonymous social choice rules which respect unanimity. The link
connecting arbitrage with social choices is still very close but it takes a different form.
In this case the connection is between the contractibility of the space of preferences,
which is necessary and sufficient for the existence of continuous, anonymous rules
which respect unanimity (Chichilnisky and Heal (1980)) and limited arbitrage.
Continuity is denned in a standard manner; anonymity means that the social
preference does not depend on the order of voting. Respect of unanimity means
that if all individuals have identical preferences overall, so does the social preference;
it is a very weak version of the Pareto condition. It was shown in Chichilnisky
(1980, 1982) that, for general spaces of preferences, there exist no social choice rules
satisfying these three axioms. Subsequently Chichilnisky and Heal (1983) established
that contractibility is exactly what is needed for the existence of social choice rules.
It is worth observing that the following result is valid for any topology on the space of
preferences T. In this sense this result is analogous to a fixed point theorem or to a
maximization theorem: whatever the topology, a continuous function from a compact
convex space to itself has a fixed point and a continuous function of a compact set
has a maximum. All these statements, and the one below, apply independently of
the topology chosen:
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Theorem 10 Let T be a connected space of preferences endowed with any topology.52
Then T admits a continuous anonymous map 3> respecting unanimity
for every k > 2. if and only if T is contractible.
Proof. See Chichilnisky and Heal (1983). •
The close relation between contractibility and non-empty intersection (which is
limited arbitrage) follows from the following theorem:
Theorem 11 Let {C/i}i=i.../ be a family of convex sets in RN. The family has a
non-empty intersection if and only if every subfamily has a contractible union:
I
P | Ui ^ (b <^ ( J Ui is contractible VJ C {1.../}.
Proof. See Chichilnisky (1980 and 1993a). •
This theorem holds for general excisive families of sets, including acyclic families
and even simple families which consist of sets which need not be convex, acyclic,
open or even connected. This theorem was shown to imply the Knaster Kuratowski
Marzukiewicz theorem and Brouwer's fixed point theorem (Chichilnisky 1993a), but
it is not implied by them. Theorem 11 establishes a close link between contractibility
and non-empty intersection and is used to show that limited arbitrage, or equivalently
the lack of social diversity, is necessary and sufficient for resource allocation via social
choice rules.
Intuitively, a preference is similar to that of trader h when it prefers those alloca-
tions which assign h a consumption vector which Uh prefers. In mathematical terms
this means that the space of preferences similar to those of a subset J of traders in
the economy have gradients within the union of the market cones of the traders in J.
Formally, let the space of choices be RN and define a space of preferences as follows:
Definition 20 Let Pj consist of all those preferences which are similar to those of
the market economy E, in the sense that their gradients are in the union of the market
cones of the traders in J, see Chichilnisky (1991, 1991a)
Pj = {u : u defines a preference on R satisfying Assumption 1, and
3J C {1,..., H}:Vx£RN, Du(x) € Uhe jDh}.
In the following we assume that for the set Pj is connected, for which it suffices
that any two traders would wish to trade.53
Theorem 12 The economy E satisfies limited arbitrage if and only if for any subset
of traders J C {1, 2, ..., H} the union of all market cones UhejDh is contractible.
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Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 11. •
Theorem 13 A continuous anonymous social choice rule <£ : Pj —> Pj which re-
spects unanimity exists which for every k > 2 and every J C {1 H} if and only if
the economy E has limited arbitrage, i.e. if and only if the economy has a competitive
equilibrium and a non-empty core.
Proof. See Chichilnisky (1991, 1991a), Theorems 2,7, 10 and 12. •
9 Social Diversity and Limited Arbitrage
If the economy does not have limited arbitrage, it is called socially diverse:
Definition 21 The economy E is socially diverse when fl^Li ^h = 0-
This concept is robust under small errors in measurement and is independent of
the units of measurement or choice of numeraire. If E is not socially diverse, all
economies sufficiently close in endowments and preferences have the same property:
the concept is structurally stable. Social diversity admits different "shades"; these
can be measured, for example, by the smallest number of market cones which do not
intersect:
Definition 22 The economy E has index of diversity /(E) = H — K if K + \
is the smallest number such that 3J C {1...H} with cardinality of J = K -f 1, and
OheJ Dh — <$>• The index /(E) ranges between 0 and H — 1 : the larger the index, the
larger the social diversity. The index is smallest when all the market cones intersect:
then all social diversity disappears, and the economy has limited arbitrage.
Theorem 14 The index of social diversity is I(E) if and only if H — I(E) is the
maximum number of traders for which every subeconomy has a competitive equilib-
rium, a non-empty core, admits social choice rules which satisfy Arrow's axioms on
choices giving large utility values, and admits social choice rules which are continuous,
anonymous and respect unanimity on preferences similar to those of the subeconomy.
10 A topological invariant for the market E
This section shows that the resource allocation properties of the economy E can be
described simply in terms of the properties of a family of cohomology rings denoted
CH(E).
A ring is a set Q endowed with two operations, denoted + and x; the operation 4-
must define a group structure for Q (every element has an inverse under +) and the
operation x defined a semi group structure for Q; both operations together satisfy
an associative relation. A typical example of a ring is the set of the integers, as well
as the rational numbers, both with addition and multiplication.
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The cohomology ring of a space Y contains information about the space's topo-
logical structure, namely those properties of the space which remain invariant when
the space is deformed as if it was made of rubber. For a formal definition see Spanier
(1979). An intuitive explanation is as follows. The cohomology ring consists of maps
defined on homology groups. Intuitively a homology group consists of "'holes", de-
fined as cycles which do not bound any region in the space Y. The homology groups
are indexed by dimension. For example the circle Sl has the simplest possible "hole":
its first homology group measures that. The "torus" Si x Si has two types of holes:
therefore it has a non-zero first homology group as well as a non-zero second homol-
ogy group. Any convex, or contractible, space has no "holes" so that its cohomology
groups are all zero. In addition to the standard group structure of each cohomology
group, there is another operation, called a "cup product", which consists, intuitively,
of "patching up" elements across cohomology groups. The set of all cohomology
groups with these two operations defines the cohomology ring.
The rings CH(E) are the cohomology rings corresponding to subfamilies of market
cones {Dh} of the economy E define a topological invariant of the economy E in
the sense that they are the same for any continuous deformation of the space of
commodities on which the economy is defined, i.e. they are preserved under any
continuous transformation in the units of measurement of the commodities. They are
also preserved under small perturbations of, or measurement errors on, the traders'
preferences.
Definition 23 The nerve of a family of subsets {V^}j=ij i, in RM,54 denoted
is a simplicial complex defined as follows: each subfamily of k 4-1 sets in
with non-empty intersection is a k — simplex of the
The topological invariant CH(E) of the economy E is the family of cohomol-
ogy rings55 of the simplicial complexes defined by all subfamilies {Fh}of the family
{Dh}h=i,2...H, i-e. the cohomology rings of {nerve{Fh}h=i...H where {Fh} G {Dh}} •
{H*(nerve{Fh},V{Fh} G {Dh}}
For the following result I consider continuous deformations of the economy which
preserve its convexity and Assumption 1.
Theorem 15 The economy E with H traders has limited arbitrage, and therefore a
competitive equilibrium, a non-empty core and social choice rules if and only if:
CH{E) = 0
i.e.\/{Fh} <= {Dh} H*(nerve{Fh}) = 0
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Furthermore, the economy E has social diversity index /(E) if and only if I(E) =
H — K, where K satisfies the following conditions: (i) for every {Fh} <E {Dh} of
cardinality at most K
H*(nerve{Fh})=0,
and there exists {Jh] <G {Dh} with cardinality! Jfi} = K + 1 and
Proof. This follows directly from Chichilnisky (1993c). •
11 Related Literature on Market Equilibrium
The literature on the existence of a competitive (Walrasian) market equilibrium is
about fifty years old, starting with the classic works of Von-Neumann, Nash, Arrow
and Debreu and others. This literature has focused on sufficient conditions for exis-
tence rather than on necessary and sufficient conditions as studied here. It can be
reviewed in two parts: markets without short sales, such as those studied by Arrow
and Debreu, and markets with short sales which appear in the literature on financial
markets.
11.1 Related Literature on Equilibrium with Bounds on Short Sales
Two well known conditions are sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium56 when
X — R+. They are Arrow's "resource relatedness" condition (Arrow and Hahn,
1971), and McKenzie's "irreducibility" condition (McKenzie 1959, 1961, 1987); both
are sufficient but neither is necessary for existence. Both imply limited arbitrage,
which is simultaneously necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive
equilibrium. Resource relatedness and irreducibility ensure existence by requiring
that the endowments of any trader are desired, directly or indirectly, by others, so
that the treaders' incomes cannot fall to zero. Under these conditions it is easy to
check that limited arbitrage is always satisfied, and a competitive equilibrium always
exists. Yet traders with zero or minimum income do not by themselves rule out
the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Limited arbitrage could be satisfied even
when some traders have zero income. This reflects a real situation: some individuals
are considered economically worthless, in that they have nothing to offer that others
want in a market context. Such a situation could be a competitive equilibrium.
Figure 8 provides an example. It seems realistic that markets could lead to such
allocations: one observes them all the time in city ghettos. Limited arbitrage does
not attempt to rule out individuals with minimum (or zero) income; instead, it seeks
to determine if society's evaluation of their worthlessness is shared. Individuals are
diverse in the sense of not satisfying limited arbitrage, when someone has minimal
(or zero) income, and, in addition, when there is no agreement about the value of
those who have minimal income. In such cases there is no competitive equilibrium.
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Another condition which is sufficient but not necessary for existence of a competi-
tive equilibrium is that the indifference surfaces of preferences of positive consumption
bundles should be in the interior of the positive orthant, Debreu (1959): this implies
that the set of directions along which the utilities increase without bound from initial
endowments is the same for all traders. Therefore all individuals agree on choices
with large utility values, again a form of similarity of preferences. It is immediate to
see that such economies satisfy limited arbitrage.
11.2 Related Literature on Equilibrium in Markets With Short Sales
The literature of general equilibrium with short sales has concentrated on sufficient
conditions for existence, for example Hart (1974), Kreps (1981) Hammond (1983),
Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993), and not on the question of conditions which are
simultaneously necessary and sufficient for existence as studied here and previously
in Chichilnisky (1991, 1992, 1994, 1995) and Chichilnisky and Heal (1992 and 1995).
In addition, the literature has neglected economies where the feasible individually
rational allocations do not form a compact set. Previous sufficient results for the
existence of an equilibrium in economies with short sales rely on the fact that the
set of feasible allocations is compact. Theorem 2 above (see also Chichilnisky (1991,
1992, 1994, 1995) and Chichilnisky and Heal (1992 and 1995) is original in that
it provides conditions which are necessary and sufficient for existence in economies
where feasible and individually rational allocations may be unbounded; in addition
these results are novel in that they result apply in economies with or without short
sales, and for finitely or infinitely many markets.
In the context of temporary equilibrium models, which are different from Arrow
Debreu models because forward markets are missing, Green (1973) established early
on interesting necessary and sufficient conditions on "overlapping expectations" for
the existence of a temporary equilibrium; similar conditions appear in Grandmont
(1982) also in the context of temporary equilibrium and Green's model. Sufficient
conditions for existence in economies with short sales, i.e. when X = RN, include
those of Debreu (1962), which requires the "irreversibility" of the total consumption
set X = Ylh=i Xh: this contrasts with limited arbitrage in that it applies to the
whole consumption set X rather than to global or market cones, in any case it is
only a sufficient condition for existence. Other "no arbitrage" conditions have been
used, for example in the finance literature. The connection between the standard
notion of no-arbitrage and limited arbitrage, was discussed in Section 2.2. The no-
arbitrage Condition C of Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993) is an antecedent for
limited arbitrage: it is a no-arbitrage condition which is sufficient but not necessary in
general for the existence of a competitive equilibrium; it requires that along a sequence
of feasible allocations where the utility of one trader increases beyond bound, there
exists another trader whose utility eventually decreases below this trader's utility at
the initial endowment. This result is based on a bounded sets of feasible allocations,
a conditions that is not generally satisfied in this paper.
Another condition of no-arbitrage based on recession cones appears in Werner
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(1987) and in Nielsen (1989), who provide sufficient conditions for the existence of
an equilibrium in finite dimensions. The results of (1987) and (1989) are posterior
and less general than those in those in57 Chichilnisky and Heal (1984. 1993); they are
restricted to finite dimensional economies with short sales and with strictly convex
preferences, and are based on bounded sets of feasible allocations. The same no-
arbitrage condition based on recession cones was used subsequently by Page (1987)
for special models of asset prices with strictly convex preferences, which are incom-
plete markets and exclude also the Arrow Debreu treatment of short sales. The
no-arbitrage condition mentioned above is sufficient but not necessary in general
economies for the existence of an equilibrium. Under certain conditions which ex-
clude the Arrow Debreu treatment of short sales, and which exclude also the case of
preferences which are not strictly convex and which may have different recession cones
at different endowments, conditions which are not required here, Werner (1987) pro-
vides two conditions, one which is proved to be sufficient for existence of equilibrium
and another which is mentioned without formal statement or proof to be necessary
for existence. The two conditions involve different cones, and there is no complete
proof in Werner (1987) that the two cones, and therefore the two conditions, are the
same. However, the two cones in Werner (1987) coincide in very special cases: for
example, when recession cones are uniform and equal to directions of strict utility in-
crease and when indifferences contain no halftones, conditions which are not required
here. Therefore Werner's comments provide a proof of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for the special case of economies with short sales, where the recession cones are
uniform and coincide with directions of strict utility increase, and when indifferences
contain no half-lines, conditions which are explicitly required for example in Page
and Wooders certainly do not hold in Werner (1987) nor in this paper. In the general
case there is no complete proof in Werner (1987) that his two cones, and therefore
his two conditions, are the same; the details are in Section 4 above. No-arbitrage
as defined in (Werner 1987) is not denned on initial parameters of the economy: it
must be verified in principle at all allocations, thus eliminating cases where limited
arbitrage is satisfied (with the same preferences) for some initial endowments and not
for others, cases which are included in the analysis of this paper.
12 Conclusions
One limitation on social diversity, limited arbitrage, is necessary and sufficient for
the existence of a competitive equilibrium, the core and social choice rules in Arrow
Debreu economies (Arrow and Debreu, 1954). Social diversity is however more subtle
and complex: it comes in many shades. Social diversity is zero when limited arbitrage
is satisfied, and it is defined generally in terms of the properties of the cohomology
rings CH of the nerve of a family of cones which are naturally associated with the
economy. The cohomology rings of these nerves contain information about which
subeconomies have competitive equilibria and a core, and which have social choice
rules; the mildest form of social diversity is sufficient for the existence of a supercore,
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which consists of all those allocations which no strict subcoalition has a reason to
block.
From these results an implicit prediction emerges about the characteristics of
economies which have evolved mechanisms to allocate resources efficiently according
to markets, cooperative game solutions, or social choice: they will exhibit only a
limited amount of social diversity. Economies which do not succeed in allocating
resource efficiently are not likely to be observed in practice, so that existing economies
are likely to exhibit limited social diversity.
Other forms of diversity come to mind—for example, the genetic diversity of a
population: this is generally believed to be favorable for the species' survival. In the
biological context, therefore, diversity appears as a positive feature. This may appear
to run counter to what is said here. Not so. Some diversity is desirable in economics
as well: as mentioned at the beginning of this paper, without diversity there would
be no gains from trade. Indeed without diversity the market would have no reason
to exist. The matter is subtle: in the end, it is a question of degrees, of how much
diversity is desirable or acceptable.
The tenet of this paper is that the economic organizations which prevail today
require a well-defined amount of diversity, and no more, to function properly. One
is led to consider the following, somewhat unsettling, question: is it possible that
existing forms of economic organization restrict diversity beyond what would be de-
sirable for the survival of our species? Or, more generally: are the forms of social
and economic organization which prevail in our society sustainable?
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1. The core is an allocation which no subset of players can improve upon within their own
endowments.
2. Limited arbitrage was introduced and named in Chichilnisky (1991, 1992, 1993c, 1994, 1994a,
1994b, 1995, 1995a) and Chichilnisky and Heal (1992).
3. No-arbitrage is discussed in Section 2.2.
4. These results were first established in Chichilnisky (1991, 1992, 1993c, 1994a, 1994b, 1995,
1995a, 1996).
5. This result was first established in Chichilnisky and Heal (1992).
6. This result and its proof were presented at the Econometric Society Meetings in Boston,
January 3-5, 1994.
7. A result first established in Chichilnisky (1991,199la, 1993c, 1994).
8. CH is defined in Section 10.
9. It is possible to use lesser concepts of equilibrium, such as quasiequilibrium and compensated
equilibrium, or equilibria where there may be excess supply in the economy. These exist
under quite general conditions, but fail to provide Pareto efficient allocations and are therefore
less attractive from the point of view of resource allocation, so they are not used here. The
relationship between limited arbitrage and quasiequilibrium is explored further in Chichilnisky
(1996a).
10. I.e. whether trades are bounded below or not.
11. Contractibility ensures that the preferences of all traders can be continuously deformed into
one and is therefore a form of similarity of preferences, see Heal (1983).
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12. This theorem is also valid for non-convex excisive families of sets (Chichilnisky 1980, 1993c),
and is shown in to imply Brower's fixed point theorem, the KKM theorem, Caratheodory's
theorem and Leray's theorem, but it is not implied by them.
13. In Chichilnisky (1980a, 1993a), a result which has Helly's theorem as a corollary.
14. Arrow and Debreu's formalization of markets assume that the consumption sets of the indi-
viduals are bounded below, an assumption motivated by the inability of humans to provide
more than a fixed number of hours of labor per day.
15. Chichilnisky and Heal (1992,1993) proved that limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for
the existence of a competitive equilibrium in economies with infinitely many markets.
16. I work within a standard framework where preferences are convex and uniformly non-satiated,
Section 1. These include all standard convex preferences including: linear of partly linear,
constant elasticity of substitution (CES), Cobb Douglas, Leontief preferences, strictly convex
preferences with indifference surfaces which intersect the coordinate lines or not and which
contain half lines or not.
1 /. Or expectations.
18. As is done in finite dimensions. The Hahn-Banach theorem requires that one of the convex
sets being separated has a non-empty interior.
19. See e.g. Chichilnisky (1993a) and more recently Le Van (1996).
20. See also Chichilnisky and Heal (1992).
21. Called the Pareto frontier. The connection between limited arbitrage and the compactness of
the Pareto frontier is of central importance for resource allocation. This connection was first
pointed out and established in Chichilnisky (1991, 1992, 1994a, 1995) and Chichilnisky and
Heal (1992, 1993).
22. R% = {(xu...,xN) € RN :Vi,Xi>0}.
23. If x, y £ RN, x > y O \/i X{ > yi; x > y <&• x > y and for some i, X{ > yi\ and
x » y^Vi, Xi > yi.
24. Namely independent of the utility representations.
25. This means that if X £ dR+ and u(x) > 0, then Du{x) is not orthogonal to
at Ax, VA > 0. This condition includes strictly convex preferences, Cobb Douglas and
CES preferences, many Leontief preferences u(x,y) — min(ax, by), preferences which are
indifferent to one or more commodities, such as u{x, y, z) = y/x -\- y, preferences with
indifference surfaces which contain rays of dR+ such as u(x,y,z) = X, and preferences
defined on a neighborhood of the positive orthant or the whole space, and which are increasing
along the boundaries, e.g. u(x, y:z) = X-\-y-\-Z.
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26. Smoothness is used to simplify notation only: uniform non satiation requires no smoothness.
This is a generalized Liftschitz condition: when preferences admit no smooth utility repre-
sentation, then one requires Ete. K > 0: K \\ X — y | |> | u(y) — u(x) | and 38 > 0 :
suV-\x-yv<s i u(y) -u{x) | > s\\x -y\\, for alia:.?/ G X.
27. N is empty when \/h. Q^ > > 0.
28. The global cone A(ph, O ,^) has points in common with Debreu's (1959) "asymptotic cone"
corresponding to the preferred set of U^ at the initial endowment O^, in that along any of
the rays of A^,(fi^) utility increases. Under Assumption 1, its closure Ayilh), equals the
"recession" cone introduced by Rockafeller, but not generally: along the rays in Ayll^) utility
increases beyond the utility level of any other vector in the space. This condition need not be
satisfied by Debreu's asymptotic cones (Debreu 1959) or by Rockafeller's "recession" cones.
For example, for Leontief type preferences the recession cone through the endowment is the
closure of the upper contour, which includes the indifference curve itself. By contrast, the
global cone A^^l^) is the interior of the upper contour set. Related concepts appeared in
Chichilnisky (1976, 1986); otherwise there is no precedent in the literature for global cones.
The cones used in the literature on no-arbitrage were Rockafeller's recession cones, until
Chichilnisky (1991, 1992) and Chichilnisky and Heal (1992).
29. This cone G^y^l^j appears also in Monteiro Page and Wooders (1995) which is a comment
on Chichilnisky (1995).
30. The market cone £X is the whole consumption set X = R when S{E) has a vector
assigning strictly positive income to all individuals. If some trader has zero income, then this
trader must have a boundary endowment.
31. A 'boundary ray' T in R+ consists of all the positive multiples of a vector V E dR_^_ :
r = {w <E R% : 3\ > 0 s.t. w = Xv}
32. This includes Cobb-Douglas, constant elasticity of substitution (CES), preferences with indif-
ference surfaces of positive consumption contained in the interior of R_^_ , linear preferences,
piecewise linear preferences, most Leontief preferences, preferences with indifference surfaces
which intersect the boundary of the positive orthant (Arrow and Hahn (1971)) and smooth
utilities defined on a neighborhood of X which are transversal to its boundary dX.
33. The expression G(E) < OO holds when V/l, SUpr;E.;Eeji^\ U^x) = OO as is assumed here; it
must be replaced by G(E) < S U p ^ ^ H . ^ ^ Q } \J2h=l uh(^h) ~
some positive fc, when Sliprx.;r6jY\ Uh{x) < OO.
34. Zc denotes the complement of the set Z.
35. A standard example of this phenomenon is in L ^ = {/ : R —• R '. SViPxeR | |/(a ')ll *"-
oo}. Society's endowment is Q =(1,1,...,1,—)> tra<ier o n e n a s a preference U\(x) = S\ip(xi),
and trader two has a preference U2(x) = Yli w(xi)A~z, 0 < A < 1. Then giving one more
unit of the ith good to trader two always increases trader two's utility without decreasing that
of trader one, and the Pareto frontier cannot be closed, see Chichilnisky and Heal (1993).
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36. Recall that the Pareto frontier is defined as the set of individually rational, feasible and efficient
utility allocations, see Section 1.2.
37. A set X C H is bounded below when there exists y £ H : Vx G H, X > y.
38. A topological space X is homeomorphic to another Y when there exists an onto map / :
X —• V which is continuous and has a continuous inverse.
39. The results on equilibrium in this paper originated from a theorem in Chichilnisky and Heal
(1984, 1993) a paper which was submitted for publication in 1984, nine years before it appeared
in print: these dates are recorded in the printed version. Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993)
provided a no-arbitrage condition and proved it is sufficient for the existence of a competitive
equilibrium with or without short sales, with infinitely or finitely many markets. See also the
following footnote.
40. Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993), Hart (1974) Hammond ((1983) and Werner (1987) among
others, have defined various no-arbitrage conditions which they prove, under certain conditions
on preferences, to be sufficient for existence of an equilibrium in different models. Except
for Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993). None of these no-arbitrage conditions is generally
necessary for existence. Within economies with short sales (which exclude Arrow Debreu's
markets), and where preferences have no halnines in the indifference surfaces (which exclude
"flats"), Werner (1987) remarks (p. 1410, last para.) that another related condition (p.
1410, line -3) is necessary for existence, without however providing a complete proof of the
equivalence between the condition which is necessary and that which is sufficient. In general,
however, the two conditions in (Werner 1987) are defined on different sets of cones: the
sufficient condition is defined on cones S{ (p. 1410, line -14) while the necessary condition is
defined on other cones, D{ (p. 1410, -3). The equivalence between the two cones depends on
properties of yet another family of cones Wi (see p. 1410, lines 13-4). The definition of Wi on
page 1408, line -15 shows that W^ is different from the recession cone i?^, (which are uniform
by assumption) and therefore the cone Wi need not be uniform even when the recession cones
are, as needed in Werner's Proposition 2. His argument for necessity is however complete
in a very special case: when preferences have uniform recession cones, the recession cones
coincide with directions of strict utility increase and indifferences have no half lines. In general,
however, even for the special case of economies with short sales and with strictly convex
preferences, Chichilnisky (1991, 1992, 1994 and 1995) and the results presented here appear
to provide the first complete proof of a condition (limited arbitrage) which is simultaneously
necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
41. The no-arbitrage conditions in Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993), and Werner (1987) do not
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for all the economies considered in this paper: all
prior results (except for those in Chichilnisky 1991, 1992, 1994,1995) depend crucially on the
fact that the set of feasible allocations is compact. By contrast, the boundedness of feasible
allocations is neither required, nor it is generally satisfied, in the economies considered in this
paper, because although the feasible allocations may be unbounded, there exists a bounded
set of allocations which reach all possible feasible utility levels.
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42. A pseudoequilibrium, also called quasiequilibrium, is an allocation which clears the market
and a price vector at which traders minimize cost within the utility levels achieved at their
respective allocations. The connection between limited arbitrage and quasiequilibrium is
studied in Chichilnisky (1996a). For the proof of existence of a quasiequilibrium cf. Negishi
(1960), who studied the case where the economy has no short sales. For cases where short
sales are allowed, and therefore feasible allocations may be unbounded, a method similar to
Negishi's can be used, see e.g. Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993) and Chichilnisky (1991,
1992, 1994,1995). With strictly convex preferences, limited arbitrage implies that feasible
allocations form a bounded set; otherwise, when indifferences have "flats", the set of feasible
allocations may be unbounded. However in this latter case there exists a bounded set of
feasible allocations which achieves all feasible utility levels, and this suffices for a Negishi-type
proof of existence to go through.
43. Also known in subsequent work as "properness", see Chichilnisky (1993) and Le Van (1996).
44. I proved this result in the finite dimensional case while at Stanford University in the Spring
and Summer of 1993, stimulated by conversations with Curtis Eaves, and presented this result
and its proof at the January 3-5, 1994 Meetings of the Econometric Society in Boston.
45. See also Chichilnisky (1994, 1996).
46. In the economy E the traders' preferences are denned over private consumption Ui '. R —>
R, but they define automatically preferences over allocations in R x : Ui{x\...Xi{) >
47. See also Chichilnisky (1982).
48. A space X is contractible when there exists a continuous map / : X X [0, 1] —• X and
Xo G X such that Mx, f(x, 0) = X and f(x, 1) = Xo.
49. The concept of "large utility values" is purely ordinal; it is defined relative to the maximum
utility value achieved by a utility representation.
50. If indifferences are bounded below, nothing is required of the sets of gradients. These condi-
tions can be removed, but at the cost of more notation.
51. Recall that we have assumed, without loss, that S U p ^ ^ uh{%) — °°- Otherwise the same
statement holds by replacing "> fc"by "> SUp i e ^ Uh(x) — fc."
52. T could be the space of linear preferences on R or the space of strictly convex preferences on
R , or the space of all smooth preferences. T could be endowed with the closed convergence
topology, or the smooth topology, or the order topology, etc. T must satisfy a minimal
regularity condition, for example to be locally convex (every point has a convex neighborhood)
or, more generally, to be a parafinite CW complex. This is a very general specification,
and includes all the spaces used routinely in economics, finite or infinite dimensional, such
as all euclidean spaces, Banach and Hubert spaces, manifolds, all piece-wise linear spaces,
polyhedrons, simplicial complexes, or finite or infinite dimensional CW spaces.
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53. Since we apply Theorem 11, we require that the space of preferences Pj be connected. In a
market economy, this requires that every two traders have a reason to trade, but says nothing
about sets of three or more traders, nor does it imply limited arbitrage.
54. Vz.V; C RM.
55. With integer coefficients.
56. Not all Arrow-Debreu exchange economies have a competitive equilibrium, even when all
individual preferences are smooth, concave and increasing, and the consumption sets are
positive orthants, X = R+ , see for example Arrow and Hahn (1971), Chapter 4, p. 80.
57. The results on existence of an equilibrium in Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993) (which
are valid in finite or infinite dimensional economies) contain as a special case the results
on existence of equilibrium in Werner (1987). The no-arbitrage Condition C introduced by
Chichilnisky and Heal (1984, 1993) is weaker that the no-arbitrage condition denned by Werner
(1987). As recorded in its printed version, Chichilnisky and Heal (1993) was submitted for
publication in February 1984. As recorded in its printed version, Werner's paper (1984) was
submitted for publication subsequently, in July 1985
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